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THE PLACE OF LAW IN IVAN ILLICH’S
VISION OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
BRUCE MILLER*
INTRODUCTION: WHY ILLICH NOW?
In the spring of 2011, when this conference on the thought of
Ivan Illich was convened, the New Deal consensus in American
politics seemed finally to be played out. Its apparent atrophy had
been a long time coming. Beginning with the electoral triumph of
Ronald Reagan in 1980, and perhaps sooner, anti-liberal politicians
had successfully appealed to the American electorate with increas
ingly forceful attacks on the reformist ideology fashioned during
the long presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. This ideology was ad
hered to by Roosevelt’s Democratic successors, and would be suc
cessors, through the administrations of John Kennedy and of
Lyndon Johnson and the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey.1
At first, these attacks were mainly indirect. For example, Pres
ident Reagan, despite his pithy and memorable criticism of the ca
pacity of government, especially the national government, to
improve American domestic life (“[G]overnment is not the solution
to our problem[s]; government is the problem[,]”)2 took care never
to urge the dismantling of the specific institutional achievements of
New Deal liberalism.3 If he was more than adept at using the infa
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. Thanks to
Jennifer Levi and the members of the Illich Reading Group for organizing this Confer
ence and Symposium; to Raquel Babeu, J.D. Western New England University 2012,
for exceptional research help; to the editors and staff of the Western New England Law
Review for expert editing; and to Marcella Haynes for patience and painstaking produc
tion help far beyond the call of duty.
1. See generally THOMAS FRANK, PITY THE BILLIONAIRE: THE HARD-TIMES
SWINDLE AND THE UNLIKELY COMEBACK OF THE RIGHT (2012); TONY JUDT, ILL
FARES THE LAND (2010); JEFF MADRICK, AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF FINANCE
AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT (2011).
2. Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981, RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LI
BRARY, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/12081a.htm (last visited
May 24, 2012).
3. See Mark W. Peacock, Ronald Reagan Quotes on Government and Liberty,
APPALACHIAN CONSERVATIVE (Apr. 4, 2009, 8:45 AM), http://appalachianconservative.
wordpress.com/2009/04/04/ronald-reagan-quotes-on-government-and-liberty/ (provid
ing a list of famous Reagan quotations).
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mous welfare queen caricature to stoke the outrage of those who
would now be called his base,4 Reagan was quick to reassure that
same base of his firm commitment to the preservation of the social
safety net, and especially of Social Security and Medicare, the pil
lars that held that net aloft.5 Similarly, although President Reagan
also successfully promoted significant deregulation of the banking
industry,6 the safeguards offered by public insurance agencies es
tablished during the New Deal protected depositors, with his bless
ing, from losses caused by the resulting scandals and excesses.7
President Reagan is further often credited (or blamed) for trig
gering the now three-decade decline in the power and rights of or
ganized labor, because of the exemplary force of his decision to end
the strike of unionized air traffic controllers that greeted his inaugu
ration by terminating the strikers.8 Nevertheless, though willing to
act forcefully against the interests of labor, Reagan never criticized
the legal foundations of collective bargaining enacted by the Wag
ner Act, and often spoke with pride of his own background as a
union leader.9 And, while publicly espousing the virtues of “sup
ply-side” economic policies and Laffer curve-inspired tax cuts for
the investing and managing classes,10 President Reagan did not
hesitate to adopt expansionary fiscal policies (albeit chiefly in the
form of deficit spending on military budgets) as an antidote to the
deep 1982 recession that threatened his prospects for re-election.11
By 2011, things were very different. Most Republican mem
bers of Congress had pledged never to permit an increase in federal
4. See Paul Krugman, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19krugman.html?scp=17&sq=&st=nyt.
5. See id. See generally BRUCE SCHULMAN, THE SEVENTIES 218-52 (2011).
6. SCHULMAN, supra note 5, at 231-32.
7. See generally Michael P. Malloy, Foreword: . . . And Backward: Death and
Transfiguration Among the Savings Associations, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S1 (1991).
8. SCHULMAN, supra note 5, at 233. See generally THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL
ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMER
ICAN POLITICS (1986).
9. Joseph A. McCartin, Op-Ed., The Strike that Busted Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
2, 2011, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/opinion/reagan-vs
patco-the-strike-that-busted-unions.html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt.
10. See generally BRUCE R. BARTLETT, REAGONOMICS: SUPPLY SIDE ECONOMICS
IN ACTION (1982) (providing a background and history of the Laffer Curve).
11. See generally LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUTION OF
ECONOMIC THINKING AND POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997); Leonard Silk,
Economic Scene; Is Reagan a Keynesian?, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1985, § D, at 2, availa
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/19/business/economic-scene-is-reagan-a-keyne
sian.html.
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taxes on the wealthy, no matter the consequence.12 In August, they
showed themselves willing, even anxious, to enforce this pledge
even if the U.S. Treasury defaulted for the first time on its obliga
tions to creditors as a result.13 In the aftermath of the 2008 finan
cial collapse and resulting panic, the federal government quickly
socialized much of the resulting loss to capital with massive infu
sions of public funds to many of the very institutions whose policies
produced the crisis.14 But notwithstanding widespread consensus
among economists that these policies could never have been imple
mented but for the gradual demise of the banking and investment
regulatory structure established by the New Deal,15 Congress re
mained unwilling to restore much, if any, of that structure.16 Many
economists and fiscal experts thus believed that the practices and
relationships which issued in the 2008 collapse remained largely in
tact and that another, similar crisis was likely to occur in the fore
seeable future.17
The 2008 panic spawned a deep and ruinous recession, the
worst since the Great Depression that ushered in Franklin
Roosevelt’s presidency.18 But despite the presumed (since the New
Deal) efficacy of aggressive, counter-cyclical, Keynesian fiscal poli
cies in countering the widespread unemployment the recession
caused,19 President Obama proposed only very modest economic
12. Charles Postel, Why Norquist’s Pledge is Different, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2011,
9:33 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70111.html.
13. Charles Babington, Norquist Bullies GOP into No-Win Tax Position, FISCAL
TIMES (July 3, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/07/03/AP-Norquist
Bullies-GOP-into-No-Win-Tax-Position.aspx#page1.
14. David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/04/
business/economy/04bailout.html.
15. Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26in
quiry.html?scp=2&sq=&st=nyt.
16. Cyrus Sanati, 10 Years Later, Looking at Repeal of Glass-Steagall, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/10-years-later-look
ing-at-repeal-of-glass-steagall/.
17. Hal Scott, Little to Celebrate on Dodd-Frank’s Birthday, FINANCIAL TIMES
(July 19, 2011,11:45 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7fcc735e-b257-11e0-8784-00144fea
bdc0.html.
18. Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI.
19. Ezra Klein, Paul Krugman vs. the White House: Stimulus Edition, WASH.
POST (Dec. 21, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/
paul-krugman-vs-the-white-house-stimulus-edition/2011/08/25/gIQAQ5gt9O_blog.html;
Paul Krugman, The Obama-Keynes Mystery, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2011, 12:15 PM), http:/
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stimulus measures, which were trimmed further by a skeptical Con
gress.20 By the time of the Illich conference, Congress and the Pres
ident seemed unable to envision what role, if any, the federal
government might play in increasing economic demand or promot
ing employment. Instead their attention had turned to the nation’s
long-term fiscal deficit.21 And despite the clarity with which recent
increases in this deficit could be traced to the nation’s decisions to
embark on two expensive overseas wars22 and simultaneously to
adopt, then reinstate, significant cuts in federal income tax rates,23
the focus of their fiscal concern was largely on the so-called entitle
ment programs—Medicare, Medicaid, and even the crown jewel of
New Deal reform, Social Security.24 By the late summer of 2011,
one Republican candidate to oppose President Obama’s 2012 re
election bid described Social Security as a “Ponzi scheme” based on
a “monstrous lie,” and seemed to call for its abolition.25
The legal underpinnings of collective bargaining were also
under siege by the time of the Illich Conference. President
Obama’s fainthearted proposal to strengthen organizing rights for a
much diminished private sector labor movement had died a quick
and mostly silent death in a hostile Congress.26 ector unions, whose
membership ranks remained relatively robust in relation to their
/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/the-obama-keynes-mystery/. See generally
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008
(2008).
20. David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Deal Reached in Congress on $789 Bil
lion Stimulus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/02/12/us/politics/12stimulus.html.
21. Jackie Calmes, Obama’s Budget Focuses on Path to Rein in Deficit, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/us/politics/
15obama.html?pagewanted=all; Carl Hulse, House Republicans Propose $4 Trillion in
Cuts Over Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/04/04/us/politics/04spend.html.
22. Teresa Tritch, Op-Ed., How the Deficit Got This Big, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2011, at SR11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/opinion/sunday/24sun4.
html.
23. See id.
24. See Michael A. Memoli, Lisa Mascaro & Christi Parsons, Obama Again
Presses for a ‘Grand Bargain’ on Debt Ceiling, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2011, http://articles.
latimes.com/2011/jul/21/nation/la-na-debt-white-house-20110721.
25. Rachel Weiner, Rick Perry Repeats Social Security is ‘Ponzi Scheme’ State
ment, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the
fix/post/rick-perry-and-mitt-romney-come-out-swinging-in-reagan-debate/2011/09/07/gI
QAhygcAK_blog.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/busi
ness/17union.html.
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private sector counterparts,27 found themselves under ferocious po
litical attack. Many politicians blamed the bargaining rights of
teachers’ unions for the problems plaguing the education of poor
children.28 State governors, most notoriously in Wisconsin29 but
also in other states,30 successfully urged the repeal of collective bar
gaining rights for most public sector workers. And state and local
government employee retirement pensions that were the frequent
fruit of the exercise of these rights seemed in many places to be ripe
for repudiation, with apparent public acquiescence.31
Worst of all, the achievements of the New Deal seem to be
going down without a fight. Formerly self-identified liberal politi
cians ran from the label.32 More fundamentally, they were unwill
ing or unable to offer a coherent ideological defense of liberal
reform.33 As a consequence, an ever more confident and deter
mined conservative assault on the programs and institutions created
by the New Deal seemed immune from either theoretical or practi
cal challenge.
But if the ideology that supported the New Deal was in tatters
and its accomplishments in apparent disarray, for many Americans
the reform impulse nevertheless burned brightly. The enthusiasm
of the Occupy Wall Street Movement that was germinating as the
Illich Conference convened provided strong evidence of its persis

27. Robert Reich, The Shameful Attack on Public Employees, HUFFINGTON POST,
(Jan. 5, 2011, 9:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/the-shameful-at
tack-on-pu_b_805050.html.
28. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Bipartisan, But Unfounded: The Assault on Teachers’
Unions, AM. EDUCATOR (Winter 2011-2012), at 14, available at http://www.aft.org/pdfs/
americaneducator/winter1112/Kahlenberg.pdf; Saul Rubinstein, Charles Heckscher &
Paul Adler, Op-Ed., Moving Beyond ‘Blame the Teacher’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/16/opinion/la-oe-adler-teachers-20110916.
29. Monica Davey, Wisconsin Court Reinstates Law on Union Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/us/politics/15wis
consin.html.
30. Sabrina Tavernise & Steven Greenhouse, Ohio Vote on Labor is Parsed for
Omens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/us/
politics/ohio-vote-on-collective-bargaining-is-parsed-for-2012-omens.html.
31. Korey Clark, Pension Peril, XVIV, No.2 ST. NET CAPITOL J. 1, 1-5 (Jan. 17,
2011), available at www.statenet.com/capitol_journal/01-17-2011/pdf.
32. See Defining Liberals, PBS (July 23, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/
liberalism.html; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Conscience of a Liberal: Ted Kennedy,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2009, 9:54 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/ted
kennedy/.
33. FRANK, supra note 1.
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tence.34 And in the face of political defeat and ideological surren
der, it made sense to wonder if this impulse might draw succor, or
even inspiration, from reform traditions different from, and per
haps, even in tension with New Deal liberalism. When the ideology
of the New Deal was at its political apex during the administrations
of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and well before the current
conservative counter-revolution had begun to gain momentum, a
small group of American thinkers offered a distinct alternative to
liberal social reform. This alternative, though not Marxist and per
haps not even situated to the left of liberalism, was nevertheless
radical in that it rejected the concentration not only of corporate
power, but also of the power of the national government on which
the New Deal relied.
I. SITUATING IVAN ILLICH
Ivan Illich was one of those thinkers. Born in Vienna in the
mid 1920s to a family of mixed ethnicity and religious back
grounds,35 Illich trained to be a Roman Catholic parish priest.36 He
served in that role in Washington Heights, Manhattan, then a very
poor community of recent, chiefly Puerto Rican, immigrants.37 The
Church subsequently assigned Illich to Puerto Rico,38 where he first
ran a language school for priests and then served as an administra
tor of the Catholic University.39 Dismissed from the university post
after expressing opposition to the church’s position on contracep
tion,40 Illich settled in Cuernavaca, Mexico, where, in 1964, he es
tablished the language school he was to operate until 1976,41 and
began to write essays of political and social criticism.42
Illich’s mature political thought emerged in the midst of the
struggle to achieve basic civil rights for African Americans and just
as the student movement that became the New Left was getting
34. See Mattathias Schwartz, Pre-Occupied: The Origins and Future of Occupy
Wall Street, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2011/11/28/111128fa_fact_schwartz.
35. Carl Mitcham, The Challenges of This Collection, in THE CHALLENGES OF
IVAN ILLICH 9, 9 (Lee Hoinacki & Carl Mitcham eds., 2002).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Chase Madar, The People’s Priest, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE, Feb. 1, 2010,
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/article/2010/feb/01/00024/.
41. Mitcham, supra note 35
42. Mitcham, supra note 35, at 9-10.
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underway in the United States. Though his published work ac
knowledges no direct influence from either of these sources, Illich’s
critique of both industrial capitalism and the then hegemonic ideol
ogy of the New Deal articulated many of the ideas that shaped
these movements of the 1960s.43
Along with such contemporaries as Paul Goodman,44 Karl
Hess,45 Jane Jacobs,46 Christopher Lasch,47 Robert Parris Moses,48
and Charles Reich,49 Illich offered a direction for social reform that
rejected the then-reigning oppositions between market ordering
and traditional social values, represented by the Republican Party,
and the New Deal commitment to government-led economic and
social progress generally associated with the Democrats. Instead,
Illich and his cohort claimed to identify a different set of opposi
tions, which, they argued, showed the failure of modern industrial
society, in either its conservative or liberal iterations, to serve the
most basic human needs. If the contemporary American political
economy offered the prospect of freedom from material want, it did
so only by holding out a fundamentally alienating consumer iden
tity as its alternative.50 If technological advances promised an end
43. See IVAN ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY 10-11, 91-92 (Harper & Row
1973) [hereinafter ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY].
44. See generally PAUL GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION (1964) (criti
cizing the impact of corporate culture on youth); PAUL GOODMAN, GROWING UP AB
SURD: PROBLEMS OF YOUTH IN THE ORGANIZED SYSTEM (5th prtg. 1960); PAUL
GOODMAN, NEW REFORMATION: NOTES OF A NEOLITHIC CONSERVATIVE (1970) (ex
ploring the dehumanizing impact of technology); PAUL GOODMAN, THE COMMUNITY
OF SCHOLARS (1962) (providing an anarchist perspective on educational theory).
45. See generally KARL HESS, DEAR AMERICA (1975) (providing an autobio
graphical account of moving away from conservatism toward participatory democracy).
46. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CIT
IES (1961) (portraying and celebrating the diversity and self sufficiency of community
life in various American cities).
47. See generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1975)
(discussing how the professionalization of human services has led to a decline in the
integrity and competency of families); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCIS
SISM (1979) (exploring narcissism from various social perspectives and lamenting its
impact on political participation).
48. See generally ERIC BURNER, AND GENTLY HE SHALL LEAD THEM: ROBERT
PARRIS MOSES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI (1994) (providing a biographical de
piction of the ideology of Robert Moses); THE ALGEBRA PROJECT, http://www.algebra.
org/history.php (last visited May 24, 2012) (outlining an organization committed to
school reform founded by Robert Moses).
49. See generally CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970) (argu
ing for a new, more participatory, form of politics based on a counter-cultural con
sciousness (Consciousness III) which rejects both traditional conservatism
(Consciousness I) and New Deal liberalism (Consciousness II)).
50. See ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 10-11, 91.
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to drudgery, the price was a growing physical and spiritual distance
between workers and the work they did.51 Though experts might
point the way towards a more efficient use of economic resources
and more harmonious social, even family, relations, increasing reli
ance on expertise undermined both popular democracy and the
competence of ordinary people to solve their own problems.52 And
if the centralized administrative state ushered in by the New Deal
served as a counterweight to concentrated corporate power, it nev
ertheless imposed its own set of hierarchical relationships that sup
planted more participatory forms of political and economic
decision-making.53
Ivan Illich’s particular elaboration of this critique is developed
most fully in a very short book, Tools for Conviviality, published in
1973.54 Illich’s primary aim in Tools was to issue a jeremiad calling
for an end to the industrial age and its modes of production.55 Il
lich’s targets were development (especially large-scale industrial
and agricultural development), technology, and the exploitation of
nature.56 In some cases, his attack anticipated the argument of
some current radical environmental activists that the abundant liv
ing standards achieved in first world countries during the 20th cen
tury must be jettisoned, on the ground that they are incompatible
with the survival of the earth’s atmosphere, and thus, of its inhabi
tants.57 But Illich’s objection to industrial society was focused less
on its threat to biological sustainability than on its destruction of
healthy social relationships and, perhaps, the very possibility of
human flourishing.58
Drawing from his studies of the health care industry,59 public
education,60 and public transportation systems,61 Illich, in Tools, ar
gued that the organizational structures created by these and other
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 91, 96-97.
Id. at 91.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at IX-XII.
Id. at 91.
See id.
See id.
See generally IVAN ILLICH, LIMITS TO MEDICINE: MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EX
PROPRIATION OF HEALTH (Marion Boyars 2002) (1975) (discussing why modern
medicine has not had positive effects on health).
60. See generally IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed.,
Harper & Row 1971) (criticizing the hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of
schools and arguing for the recognition of the competency and natural curiosity of stu
dents as central educational values).
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economic institutions characteristic of the developed world are both
counterproductive and inimical to the natural “conviviality” of the
human spirit.62 His assault on these structures was as comprehen
sive as it was fundamental. Illich’s central claim was that they
transferred power from independent people to anonymous bureau
cracies.63 More specifically, they protected formal, hierarchical ed
ucational arrangements at the expense of actual learning;64
exploited nature rather than recognizing its preservation as a “con
vivial” value;65 created material abundance while undermining the
possibility of meaning in ordinary life;66 fostered social mobility at
the expense of personal security and a sense of place;67 and, finally,
insisted on perpetual innovation at a pace which precludes the sus
tenance of an organic tradition.68 Above all, Illich insisted that pre
vailing corporate forms of industrial production degrade social
relations, monopolize imagination and motivation, and eventually
commodify every aspect of human life.69
Against this dispiriting picture, Illich urged what he called the
“inversion” of the social arrangements and institutions of industrial
society.70 By this, he meant a political process by which people be
come enlightened about the necessity to opt for a more “frugal”
standard of living, enter into social movements aimed at reclaiming
more convivial ways of life, and, finally, rediscover and revalue the
political and legal tools that can help establish and protect these
convivial life forms as they emerge.71
II.

THE ROLE OF LAW IN ILLICH’S PROPOSED
POLITICAL INVERSION

Illich’s identification of the convivial tools that might help
bring about the inversion of industrial society strove for a consis
tency between ends and means.72 He sought to reclaim, or, as he
61. See generally IVAN D. ILLICH, ENERGY AND EQUITY (Calder & Boyars 1974)
(discussing how political control of energy leads to social injustice).
62. See ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 91.
63. Id. at 91.
64. Id. at 61-73.
65. Id. at 51-54.
66. Id. at 54-61.
67. Id. at 73-79.
68. Id. at 79-82.
69. Id. at 91.
70. Id. at 108.
71. Id. at 108-09.
72. Id. at 91-92.

516

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:507

put it, to recover, three key cultural institutions: science,73 lan
guage,74 and law.75 Illich argued that the ways in which these insti
tutions approach and apprehend the world can not only generate
new social structures, but, just as importantly, can do so using
means that are themselves examples of the more convivial forms of
life these new structures encourage.76
The rule of law, through both the habits of thought it relies on
and its central institutional invention—formal adjudication—lay at
the heart of Illich’s vision of social change.77 For Illich, law’s radical
potential was a function of its blend of procedural formality and
substantive openness.78 The formal equality of adjudication under
the adversary system meant that every argument, every idea, no
matter how apparently novel or even subversive, had to be evalu
ated exclusively on its own merits, rather than filtered through leg
islative processes controlled by corporations or the bureaucratic
imperatives of administrative agencies.79 The commitment of adju
dication to offer “disinterested” tribunals, staffed by judges without
pre-conceived commitments to particular substantive outcomes, re
inforced this formal equality by neutralizing the capacity of corpo
rations and governments to dominate individuals and communities
through the sheer force of their vastly greater resources.80
For Illich, the equality assured by its procedural formality was
augmented by the inherent substantive openness of adjudication.
Illich’s argument here began, perhaps paradoxically, by assuming
the validity of the traditional distinction between the creation of
legal norms and their subsequent application by judges.81 For Illich,
adjudication was essentially a backward looking process, which
draws on already established sources of law to justify the outcomes
it reaches in particular cases.82 This reliance on past value judg
ments is its greatest strength. In celebrating it, Illich at first glance
seemed to ally himself with the well-known conservative critique of
“judicial activism,” defined by its critics as the illegitimate creation
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

92-95.
95-99.
99-107.
91-92.
91, 99-107.
99-107.
101.
104.
101-02.
102.
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of law by reform minded judges.83 And Illich did unquestionably
locate the legitimacy of adjudication in its separation of the process
from the substance of law, attainable only through the rigorously
formal application of pre-existing legal values by dispassionate, dis
interested tribunals.84
This separation did more than just underwrite the legitimacy of
adjudication. It also assured the continuity of the content of the
substantive law applied by judges.85 Here again, Illich appeared to
embrace another tenet of conservative legal thought, that the grad
ual, glacially accreting development of law that inheres in case-by
case adjudication guarantees its stability, predictability, and, most
important, its accessibility and visibility to the polity it serves.86
Characteristically though, Illich derived radical potential from
his conservative account of the rule of law. The stability of law con
ferred by adjudication was, for Illich, not the same as stasis. Indeed
the two were antithetical. The continuity of legal norms allows,
even obligates, the participants in adjudication—the parties, the
lawyers, the judges—constantly to adapt these norms, or what Illich
called the “social experience” of our legal forebears, to our deepest
present controversies.87 This wholly conventional application of es
tablished legal values to contemporary disputes entails the radical
(if gradual) malleability of the content of the particular legal doc
trines enforced by judges at any given time.
In Illich’s view, the opportunity provided by adjudication to
reassess present legal doctrines in light of past values precluded, by
definition, the final settlement of any controversy over a matter of
public concern.88 Every basic question of political and social organ
ization could be framed as a question of law and tested through the
crucible of adversarial adjudication.89 And given the formal com
mitment of the adjudicative process to openness, substantive disin
terestedness, and equal respect for all parties, even the most
fundamental challenges to current social arrangements had to be
taken seriously, and could never be summarily dismissed because of
the relative powerlessness of their proponents.90 Thus were the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 102-07.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 102-03.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 103-04.
Id.
Id. at 104.
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tools for radical social change embedded in the conventional appli
cation of settled legal principles to the changed (and dismal) condi
tions that were the object of Illich’s social criticism.
III. ILLICH’S DOUBTS

ABOUT

LAW

If Illich was optimistic about the law’s role in generating social
change, he was not naı̈ve. Even as he hoped for law’s “inversion
ary” potential, he saw many obstacles to the realization of that
hope.91 Foremost among these was the distance Illich observed be
tween the ideal form of adjudication that grounded his cautious op
timism and the actual courts he saw operating in the United
States.92 The latter were staffed by judges who were anything but
the disinterested servants of the openness to argument, equal re
spect for all parties, and “due procedure” that Illich saw as essential
to the transformation of substantive legal doctrines.93 Instead,
judges were mostly ideologues, shaped by and devoted to the pres
ervation of the social structures that produced and elevated them.94
In late 20th century America, this meant that nearly all judges were
reflexively oriented towards corporate power and the promotion of
limitless economic growth.95 The content of the substantive doc
trines articulated and defended in the decisions handed down by
these judges would inevitably embody this outlook and would, ac
cordingly, most often reinforce existing class structures, social hier
archies, and ethical norms.
The ideological hostility of judges was not the only impediment
Illich saw to the strategic use of adjudication to achieve legal and
social change.96 Beyond the limits imposed by their substantive ori
entation, judges were also distracted from serious consideration of
cases raising challenges to social structures or to the distribution of
power by the day-to-day demands of their position.97 Most ordi
nary civil litigation, Illich believed, probably rightly, involved rela
tively prosaic struggles over distribution of the material proceeds of
the existing system.98 The channeling of these disputes into the for
mal adversarial process of adjudication misused this process in
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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three important ways. First, most individual and even group con
flicts did not require adversarial adjudication in order to be re
solved justly and accurately.99 Especially when the disputants were
relatively equal in resources, more informal methods of conflict res
olution could produce faster, cheaper, and probably better out
comes.100 Second, the resort to formal adjudication for matters
where it was unnecessary risked pointless escalation of conflict,
made the disputants dependent on lawyers and other experts in
stead of their own judgment, and interposed an alienated distance
between the disputants and the process used to resolve their con
flict.101 And third, the allocation of public resources to the formali
zation of disputes that could be settled informally starved the
formal adjudication process of the resources needed to do what that
process, ideally and alone, can do best: address and decide cases
presenting challenges by individuals and communities to the power
of corporations and centralized government institutions to control
the production and distribution of social goods.102
In the face of these formidable barriers standing between the
world Illich saw (in most respects, still, the world we see as well)
and his idealized conception of what law might accomplish, it is rea
sonable to wonder why he remained even cautiously hopeful about
the prospects for realizing his conception. Part of the explanation
for Illich’s persistent, if tenuous, optimism lay in his view of the
relationship between adjudication and ideology. The ideological
character of the law declared and enforced by judges was not lim
ited to the particular doctrines that buttressed the social structures
Illich criticized. The content of the law in effect at any and all times
was inescapably a function of ideology.103 But the inevitability of
ideological bias in legal doctrine was also the very source of the
dynamism and, hence, the malleability of that doctrine. If the re
sults of adjudication were ideological, what was needed, and possi
bly achievable, was a different, more convivial, ideology.104
For Illich, the conscious actions of three social groups could
gradually usher in that ideology by generating the adoption of the
legal principles needed to support the social change he sought.105
99. Id. at 101.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 101-02.
102. Id. at 102.
103. Id. at 99.
104. Id. at 99-100.
105. Id. at 105-06.
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The first of these groups was ordinary citizens insisting on judicial
enforcement of their individual and collective rights against the
domination of corporations, especially those rights which, though
unrecognized, were nevertheless embedded in our legal tradi
tions.106 The second and third were what Illich called “exceptional”
lawyers and judges.107 The exceptional vocations each of these sets
of legal actors could pursue were, however, quite different, reflect
ing their different respective roles in the process of adjudication.
An exceptional lawyer was one who tried to use litigation strategi
cally to invert existing power relationships by arguing for the caseby-case transformation of the doctrines that sustain these relation
ships.108 Exceptional judges on the other hand, were not, and could
not legitimately be, intentional partisans of legal or social
change.109 Illich’s hope was that some (no doubt small) number of
them would, through an abiding devotion to the formal ideals of
adjudication—equal respect for all parties and for due procedure—
transcend the corporate ideological commitments which would oth
erwise shape their decisions.110 These few exceptional judges would
be open to apprehend, appreciate, and sometimes become con
vinced by the arguments presented to them by exceptional lawyers
advancing the claims of committed citizens.111 They would also be
attuned to critiques of the misuse of adversarial adjudication to pro
cess conflicts that could and should be resolved informally, either
by the disputants themselves or with the aid of non-adversarial me
diation.112 Illich hoped that their receptivity to these critiques
would prompt these “exceptional” judges to fashion more convivial
institutions for the resolution of these ordinary disputes.113
The efforts of committed citizens and “exceptional” profes
sionals are no doubt thin reeds on which to build a movement for
radical legal change. Illich’s caution against high hopes for such
change essentially concedes this point. But, paraphrasing Margaret
Mead, Illich might ask in response whether radical change has ever
been achieved in any other way.114
106. Id.
107. Id. at 106.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 106-07.
111. See id. at 104-07.
112. See id. at 101.
113. Id.
114. See Jone Johnson Lewis, Margaret Mead Quotes, ABOUT.COM, http://
womenshistory.about.com/cs/quotes/a/qu_margaretmead.htm (last visited May 24,
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To be sure, Illich’s brief for the transformative potential of the
rule of law is idealistic, perhaps touchingly so. It depends on an
explanation of the content of our past settled legal norms that he
never directly provided. It is possible that Illich’s reliance on the
application of past law to “invert” present doctrine is illusory. Our
received legal norms may be so open-ended or internally contradic
tory in content as to be vacuous. As suggested by some critical le
gal studies scholars a generation ago, adjudication may really be an
empty, purely formal game, offering no grounds for justifying its
results that are worthy of public trust.115 This skeptical view would
be consistent with the malleability and inevitably ideological char
acter of extant legal doctrine that Illich identified, but would rule
out his argument’s deep respect for the wisdom conferred by tradi
tion, and thus for the legitimacy he saw in change through law re
form litigation. Illich’s response to this critique would likely have
rested on his conviction that the roots of a more convivial way of
life than the one offered by modern industrial society are immanent
in the values, including the legal values, of the past, and lie waiting
to be unearthed and deployed by “exceptional,” reform-minded
lawyers and open-minded judges.116 This optimistic conviction may
be unwarranted, but it is one that has been shared by at least some
lawyers who have fallen—some consciously, some not—under Il
lich’s influence.
One of these lawyers is a Waltham, Massachusetts, general
practitioner named Eugene Burkart,117 who actually attended the
Illich symposium. Burkart first read Tools for Conviviality as an
idealistic but alienated law student in the late 1970s.118 Illich’s cri
tique of industrial society rang true to Burkart, and Illich’s hopes
2012) (“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change
the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”).
115. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); ROBERTO MAN
GABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 10-14
(1984); Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social
Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV.
509, 560-67 (1984).
116. See ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 106.
117. Eugene J. Burkart, From the Economy to Friendship: My Years Studying
Ivan Illich, in THE CHALLENGES OF IVAN ILLICH 156 (Lee Hoinacki & Carl Mitcham
eds., 2002).
118. Id. at 154.
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for its inversion inspired him to see the practice of law as a poten
tially transformative calling.119 In an essay recalling Illich’s influ
ence on him, Burkart reports that his first step after reading
“Tools” was to abandon law “schooling” for a more practically use
ful legal education. “The book was also helpful; it gave me the
courage to skip most of my classes the last year of law school, so
that I could work as much as possible in a legal aid office, learning
the skills of a practicing attorney.”120 Burkart also drew on Illich’s
celebration of immersion in a local, organic way of life over the
impersonality of a commitment to personal advancement. Burkart
“wanted to know and be a part of the community where I worked; I
wanted to be rooted in a place.”121
At the same time, Tools for Conviviality offered Burkart a
path to use his chosen work to address the injustices he saw in the
established political order. Thus, he “began the practice of law in
the hopes that [he] could use law as an instrument for [radical] so
cial change.”122 Burkart’s hopes were gradually chastened. He de
scribed his early life as a lawyer this way:
Over the course of the next five years or so I was immersed in
learning the ropes of a legal practice. The kind of law we did,
general practice, put me in touch with the way law affects the
lives of the great majority of people: through wills, divorce, crimi
nal defense, disability claims, auto accidents, buying and selling
homes, tenant and consumer cases. While I received a lot of sat
isfaction from seeing a good result achieved for individual clients,
I began to be troubled by something: A good result might bene
fit someone in the short term, but I did not see it having any
larger effect. I saw that the ordinary practice of law did not work
so much to make society more just but rather kept things as they
were, and running smoothly.123

Eventually, Burkart began to fear that Illich’s critique of the
potentially baleful effects of professional expertise might apply to
his own work. “[S]ervice providers,” he observed,
see people as being in need of their services. . . . All of this is
good for business[,] . . . [but] insidious since service systems take
away from people what they could do on their own, . . . los[ing]
. . . self-reliance and independence[.] . . . After a while, I saw the
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 156-57.

2012]

LAW AND ILLICH’S VISION OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

523

joke. When people asked me, “How’s work going?” I would an
swer, “Never been better. Families are falling apart, so there is
plenty of divorce and juvenile delinquency; arrests are up . . .
auto accidents and injuries at work are high . . . [b]usiness is
good.”124

Some years later, during Illich’s intermittent academic sojourns
in the United States, Burkart and Illich became acquaintances, and
eventually friends.125 By then (the 1980s), Burkart reports, Illich
himself had concluded that legal work would not likely lead to fun
damental social change. For both Burkart and Illich, law only
served as a “guide through the[ ] thicket[ ].”126 Law was still a con
vivial tool, but one which could only help lawyers, clients, and com
munities settle with, rather than transform, the alienation of
modern industrial society.127
If Eugene Burkart came to doubt the capacity of law and law
yers to alter, or as Illich would put it, invert, existing social struc
tures, there was another group of lawyers, roughly Burkart’s
contemporaries, who based their professional identities on the
transformative potential of law reform litigation. These lawyers
were the staff attorneys of the legal services programs and the re
gional and national support centers established by the White House
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) between about 1964 and
1974, when OEO was dismantled and legal services for the poor
professionalized by Congress’s creation of the Legal Services Cor
poration.128 These early Legal Services programs were inspired in
part by the exemplary success of Charles Houston, Thurgood Mar
shall, and their colleagues with the NAACP Legal Defense and Ed
ucation Fund in urging a revised understanding of the Equal
Protection Guarantee129 to prompt the Supreme Court to declare
officially sanctioned racial segregation unconstitutional.130 The
strategy of the litigation campaign against segregation was an appli
124. Id. at 157-58.
125. Id. at 157.
126. Id. at 160.
127. Id. at 156-57.
128. JOHN A. DOOLEY & ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY I.4,
I.15, I.22 (1984).
129. See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936); see also RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education and Black
America’s Struggle for Equality 192-94 (Vintage Books 1977) (1975) (describing the
litigation campaign to abolish de jure segregation).
130. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see KLUGER, supra
note 129, at 702-08.
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cation, long before he set it out in Tools for Conviviality, of Illich’s
argument for the transformative potential of the inherent conserva
tism of case-by-case adjudication. Drawing on a venerable source
of settled law, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Houston and Marshall famously argued that a proper
application of that settled legal norm actually invalidated the very
political and social practices that conventional legal and social
thought had taken it to support.131 Through the gradual accretion
of precedents achieved through carefully constructed lawsuits, they
subjected an entrenched social institution first to re-evaluation,
then to (formal, at least) dissolution.132 It was hard to imagine a
more striking example of successfully applying established legal val
ues to invert present legal doctrine.
The Legal Services programs and support center lawyers strove
to repeat Houston and Marshall’s strategy in the many areas of law
which affected the lives of their impoverished clients.133 Their goals
were ambitious. They saw their task as blending the enforcement
of previously unrecognized legal norms and the reform of estab
lished legal doctrine to change the conditions under which poor
people were obliged to live.134 Representing client groups such as
farm workers, welfare recipients, tenants, students, and the elderly
poor, legal services lawyers believed they could prompt judges to
transform the legal rules governing landlord-tenant relations, public
assistance programs, workplace conditions, and public schools for
the benefit of their clients.135 For a time, they achieved some nota
ble successes, especially in the areas of employment,136 housing,137
and public benefits138 law. But the accomplishments of this drive
towards social reform through law reform litigation began to dwin
131. Pearson, 182 A. at 590; see KLUGER, supra note 129, at 191-94.
132. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Pearson, 182 A. at 594; see KLUGER, supra note
129, at 186-94.
133. See DOOLEY & HOUSEMAN, supra note 128, at I.13-15. (1984); see also SU
SAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND SU
PREME COURT DECISION MAKING 22, 30 (1990).
134. LAWRENCE, supra note 133, at 22, 30.
135. See id.; DOOLEY & HOUSEMAN, supra note 128, at I.15, I.22.
136. See generally United Farm Workers Org. Comm. v. Monterey Cnty., 94 Cal.
Rptr. 263 (Cal. 1971).
137. See Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Durham, 386 U.S. 670, 673-74 (1967);
see also LAWRENCE, supra note 133, at 12 & n.30.
138. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968); see also
MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED 68, 80, 110-18 (1993).
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dle by the mid 1970s,139 and the effort itself had ebbed considerably
by the close of that decade.140 Still, the impetus to law reform con
tinues to inform, at least in part, the identity and aspirations of
many legal services lawyers.141 And the strategy of deploying tradi
tional legal values to transform extant legal doctrine has been taken
up by more contemporary cause-oriented lawyers, most notably in
the women’s,142 disability rights,143 and gay, lesbian, and transgender rights movements.144
The law reform litigation effort shared (and still shares) Ivan
Illich’s idealism about the possibility of fundamental social change
and law’s role in bringing about this change. In the early legal ser
vices period, this idealism could be remarkably naı̈ve. A personal
anecdote offers a not atypical example of this naivete.
´ As new law
yers with a legal services support center focused on the rights of
elderly poor clients, a colleague and I were charged with designing
a strategy to reform the legal doctrines which governed the rights of
workers governed by private pension plans. This was during the
early 1970s, before the enactment of the Employee Retirement In
come Security Act, which provides a measure of federal statutory
regulation of these plans. We saw our task as daunting, to be sure.
But in our eyes, the path to success was completely clear. We
would first write a law review article for the Clearinghouse Review,
a specialized journal for legal services lawyers. The article, called
Litigation as a Tool for Private Pension Reform,145 would show how
long established values embedded in the common law, especially
principles drawn from the law of trusts and contracts, could be
deployed in new ways to revise then prevalent legal doctrine in
ways that would assure more rights, and greater justice, for the re
139. Harry P. Stump, Book Review, 1 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 1, 25 (1990) (re
viewing SUSAN E LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990)), available at http://www.bsos.umd.
edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/lawrence.htm.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See generally Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); FAQs: The ACLU Women’s Rights Project and Wo
men’s History Month, ACLU.ORG (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/
faqs-aclu-womens-rights-project-and-womens-history-month.
143. See generally CENTER FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, http://www.centerfor
publicrep.org/ (last visited May 24, 2012).
144. See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DE
FENDERS, http://www.glad.org/ (last visited May 24, 2012).
145. National Senior Citizens Law Center, Litigation as a Tool for Private Pen
sion Reform, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 593 (1973).
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tirees we and other legal services lawyers would then represent in
litigation. We had no doubt that we would find the roots of con
temporary justice in ancient principles of law. It was simply a mat
ter of digging them out, showing how they could be applied, and
then filing lawsuits to apply them. Houston and Marshall had
shown the way in the desegregation struggle. We believed we could
use their convivial tools in our very different arena of law reform.
About six months after my colleague and I finished our article,
we filed our first case.146 A month later, I read Illich’s account of
law’s role in achieving social change in Tools for Conviviality. I had
no doubt that he was describing and endorsing our work, even if he
seemed considerably more cautious about its prospects for success
than we were.
V. ILLICH’S ENDURING RELEVANCE
Ivan Illich lived long enough to see the waning of the influence
of his ideas and the apparent (though, of course, perhaps tempo
rary) demise of the prospects for the sorts of basic change he hoped
for. Nonetheless, his ideas about the law and the relationship of
litigation and social change provide a lens that can illuminate some
developments in the culture of civil adjudication in the United
States since his death.
Significantly, Illich’s image of ideologically self-conscious law
yers, whether “exceptional” or not, pursuing social change through
law reform litigation continues to shape the identity of “cause ori
ented” lawyers today as much as it did forty years ago.147 The ex
tent to which the efforts of these lawyers have generated (or can
generate) the fundamental change in social structures Illich sought
is, of course, a matter of considerable dispute. The greatest suc
cesses of law reform litigation have been the eradication of formal
legal inequalities, first those based on race,148 then gender,149 and
now sexual identity and orientation.150 Moreover, all of these suc
cesses have been achieved largely through a straightforward appli
cation of Illich’s mode of law reform through adjudication.
Lawyers representing the civil rights, women’s, and LGBT move
ments have each proceeded by urging the case-by-case application
146. Ponce v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 628 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.
1980).
147. See ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 106.
148. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
149. ACLU.ORG, supra note 142.
150. GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, supra note 144.
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of principles long embedded in our legal tradition (here the prohibi
tion against unjust discrimination on the basis of ascribed status) to
prompt first reconsideration, and eventually repudiation, of appar
ently settled contemporary legal doctrine.
In contrast to formal inequalities, more complex structural bar
riers to social and political change have proven far more resistant to
law reform litigation strategies. Although championed convincingly
by such scholar/litigators as Abram Chayes151 and Owen Fiss,152 the
use of litigation to effect fundamental institutional reform has been
only sporadically and, perhaps, temporarily successful. Commenta
tors such as Donald Horowitz and Gerald Rosenberg have argued,
contrary to Illich, that adversarial litigation is ill-suited to and per
haps incapable of contributing significantly to such reform.153
On the other hand, Illich’s early identification of the distorted
application of adversarial adjudication to conflicts which might be
better resolved informally anticipated changes in American dispute
resolution processes that are taken for granted today. The rise of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement and the em
brace of alternatives to litigation by judges, lawyers, institutional
actors, and ordinary citizens has changed the legal landscape in
ways Illich might well endorse, at least to a degree. ADR has effec
tively moved many of what Illich considered prosaic struggles over
the distribution of the existing economic pie into more informal set
tings that are seen as more accessible to the disputants, less costly,
and less dependent on professional expertise than formal adjudica
tion. Many businesses have, with court approval, required their
customers and employees to submit disputes, even those concerning
rights protected by federal law, to resolution by arbitration rather
than litigation. Even federal courts have reoriented themselves,
through both rules and changed cultural practices, toward heavy re
liance on ADR and an expectation that nearly all civil cases will be
resolved without trial.154 If anything, this de-emphasis on formal
adjudication may have gone too far, perhaps depriving relatively
powerless litigants of their only real opportunity to press serious
151. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
152. See generally Owen M. Fiss, The New Procedure, 54 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 209
(1985).
153. See generally DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1977); GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SO
CIAL CHANGE? (1991).
154. Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 225-28, 230-34 (1995).
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claims of right to a single decision-maker capable of giving them a
fair hearing; the disinterested judge praised by Illich for his or her
commitment to due procedure, equal respect for all parties, and
openness to every substantive argument. The measured yet trench
ant critiques of the ADR movement offered by such commentators
as Judith Resnik,155 and again, Owen Fiss,156 are in any event based
substantially on the same values Illich saw in the rigorous formalism
of the judicial decision.
But a more significant threat in our time to Illich’s hopes for
the transformative potential of the rule of law may lie in the dimin
ished stature of the ideal of disinterested adjudication. Illich took
for granted that the aspirations to procedural neutrality, equal
treatment of all litigants, and openness to all substantive arguments
were inherent in the institution of formal adjudication. As a practi
cal matter, though, he could not help but observe that these aspira
tions were inevitably compromised, sometimes even corrupted, by
the ideological commitments of judges.157 Still, for Illich, pursuit of
the ideal virtues of adjudication nevertheless abided as a regulative
ideal, adhered to faithfully by the “exceptional” judges, and as a
matter of occasional necessity by the rest.158
Illich’s faith in the enduring character of these virtues may,
however, have been too optimistic. For example, it is a truism, or
nearly so, that appointments to the Supreme Court have for at least
a generation been significantly influenced by the perceived ideolog
ical commitments of those nominated to serve. And though this
influence is unquestionably bipartisan, its effects on the appoint
ment process have been very different in Republican as compared
to Democratic administrations. Starting with President Reagan’s
ultimately unsuccessful nomination of Robert Bork, Republican
presidents have appeared usually to offer nominees they believed
to be extremely conservative precisely because of their extreme
conservatism, daring Democratic senators to oppose these nomi
nees on ideological grounds.159 The one significant exception to
this strategy, President George H.W. Bush’s nomination of Justice
David Souter, prompted his son’s redoubled commitment to it, as
155. See generally id.
156. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984);
Fiss, supra note 152, at 210.
157. ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 102.
158. Id. at 106.
159. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS: A CONSTI
TUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, 58-60 (Duke University Press 2003).
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evidenced by the appointment of Justice Samuel Alito and Chief
Justice John Roberts. Democratic presidents, on the other hand,
faced with (or fearing) threatened ideological opposition from Re
publican senators, have eschewed the appointment of obvious ideo
logical liberals, offering instead nominees who either seemed
politically centrist, had lower court judicial records that evinced
moderation, or both.
The result has been a Supreme Court which, especially since
Justice O’Connor’s retirement in 2005, is deeply divided, yielding
up one 5-4 decision after another, with the justices divided along
predictably partisan lines.160 The division seems ideological, to be
sure, but oddly so. The ideologues appeared to be the five justices
appointed by Republican presidents who constitute the Court’s
usual majority in closely decided cases. The dissenters, now com
prised of the four justices appointed by the last two Democratic
presidents, have largely retained their pre-appointment reputations
for moderation. It is as if a pitched battle is underway over the
content of American law, but only one side has taken up arms.
This characterization of the diminished status of judicial disin
terestedness on the current Supreme Court may be tendentious,
based as it is on appearances. Appearances can deceive, of course,
and in any event are themselves hardly ideologically neutral. Nev
ertheless, on at least two notable occasions, the Court’s five justice
Republican majority has issued decisions that overtly disavow Il
lich’s prized virtues of equal treatment of parties, due procedure,
and openness to all substantive arguments. The first and more no
torious of these decisions was Bush v. Gore, in which the Court
called a halt to the recount of popular votes in Florida,161 thereby
securing the 2000 presidential election for George W. Bush. The
Court’s decision to intervene in a closely contested presidential
election was widely criticized as imprudent, especially in light of the
procedures for political resolution of the dispute prescribed by the
12th Amendment162 and the Electoral Count Act.163 And the plu
rality opinion invalidating the Florida recount164 rested on a much
160. Infra notes 161, 167; see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2547, 2561 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744, 1756
(2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); D.C. v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
161. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000).
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Bush, 531 U.S. at 153-54.
163. Electoral Count Act of 1887, 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-21 (2006); Bush, 531 U.S. at 154.
164. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110.

530

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:507

more robust reading of the Equal Protection guarantee165 than any
of its subscribers had previously suggested was applicable to state
voting procedures. But the infamous portion of the Bush v. Gore
holding, for purposes of Illich’s model form of adjudication, was the
plurality’s admonition that its ruling and the rationale offered to
justify it were applicable only “to the present circumstances.” Its
authors would not regard the ruling as precedent in future cases
that might otherwise be analogous, “for the problem of equal pro
tection in election processes generally presents many complexi
ties.”166 It is difficult to imagine a more direct or complete
repudiation of the value of precedent, the obligation to treat simi
larly situated litigants equally, and the stability and predictability of
substantive law that inheres in its gradual accretion through case by
case adjudication. Bush v. Gore is, in short, is by its own terms an
openly lawless decision.
The second, more recent abnegation of the rule of law by a five
justice Republican Supreme Court majority is only slightly less bla
tant than Bush v. Gore. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, decided in 2009, the
Court changed the rules for the pleading of complaints filed by
plaintiffs in civil cases in the federal district courts.167 Before Iqbal,
all factual allegations asserted in civil complaints had long been en
titled to a temporary presumption of truth for purposes of a defen
dant’s challenge to their legal sufficiency. Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion for the court in Iqbal limited this presumption to only those
factual allegations deemed “plausible” by the federal district judge
considering the challenge.168 The plaintiffs in Iqbal were a class of
immigrants from majority Arab and/or Muslim nations of origin
who were taken into custody and detained indefinitely by American
immigration authorities as part of Attorney General Ashcroft’s ef
fort to prevent further terrorist acts in the immediate aftermath of
the attacks of September 11, 2001.169 They argued that Ashcroft
had unconstitutionally singled them out for arrest and investigative
detention on the basis of their religion and/or national origin.170 In
order for this claim to succeed, the Iqbal plaintiffs needed to prove
(and thus to allege in their complaint) that the Attorney General’s
policy was not only discriminatory in effect (not contested by the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id. at 103-11.
Id. at 109.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 1943.
Id. at 1944.
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Iqbal defendants) but also that it was prompted, in part at least, by
a prohibited discriminatory purpose.171 Of course, the plaintiffs
made these necessary allegations.172 But under the new standards
announced by Chief Justice Roberts, their assertion that the treat
ment they suffered was influenced in any way by an improper dis
criminatory purpose was deemed implausible and their claim was
accordingly directed to be dismissed.173 For the Chief Justice, At
torney General Ashcroft was motivated exclusively by his commit
ment to forestall additional terrorist attacks on the United States in
the wake of September 11.174 That motivation conclusively ruled
out the “plausibility” of any contamination of his policy by discrimi
natory animus.
Chief Justice Roberts recognized that this new pleading stan
dard required judges to make dispositive determinations of dis
puted and controversial factual questions (in Iqbal whether a policy
with an overwhelmingly disparate effect on an unpopular minority
could have been infected by a discriminatory purpose) at the onset
of litigation and without any discovery or formal consideration of
evidence.175 How were judges to do this in a manner consistent
with their formal obligations to openness, equal respect for liti
gants, and due procedure? For Roberts, the answer was to apply
their “judicial experience and common sense[,]” formed by judicial
experience.176 How this directive to rely on judicial common sense
as the basis for refusing to examine the merit of claims presented by
an injured party differs from an open invitation to indulge the ideo
logical predilections so deplored by Illich remains unexplained. In
light of the Chief Justice’s application of the “plausibility” standard
to the Iqbal claims themselves, perhaps this is because no explana
tion is possible.
The possibility of an epistemic distinction between law and
politics, between applying and creating law, or as Illich would put it,
between ideology and disinterest, has been under attack by legal
philosophers for more than a century. Beginning with Justice
Holmes, extending through the legal realists and on to their theo
retical heirs in the critical legal studies movement, many thinkers
have found this distinction impossible to sustain because of the in
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 1952.
Id. at 1951.
Id. at 1950-51.
See id. at 1953.
Id. at 1950.
Id.
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ability of judges to derive provably correct resolutions of competing
legal arguments through a mechanical application of pre-existing le
gal sources.177 The exercise of what Alexander Hamilton called
“judgment” is inevitable.178 And distinguishing judgment from its
philosophical opposite, will (or to put it slightly more gently, judi
cial discretion) continues to pose a serious problem to the legiti
macy of adjudication.179
The problem has so far been largely a theoretical one, in the
literal sense of that adjective, as most judges publicly practice their
craft as though unaware of it, publishing opinions that relentlessly
purport to rest on the application of pre-existing law to the case at
hand.180 These judges may, of course, be philosophically naı̈ve.
Perhaps more likely, they may be convinced that their practice rests
on a fiction, albeit one which must be concealed in order to pre
serve public faith in the ideal of a “government of laws not men.”181
There is, however, a third possibility, one more congenial to Illich’s
optimism about adjudication. Perhaps it is the critique of the law/
politics distinction that is naı̈ve, resting as it does on the all too easy
demonstration that there are not provably correct answers to con
tested legal questions. Perhaps the exercise of judgment to resolve
these questions is not illusory, at least from the internal perspective
of a judge who sees his or her responsibility as deciding particular
cases through the application and interpretation of pre-existing
sources of law.182 Such a judge may experience the disinterested
ness so prized by Illich, even if he or she is also only too aware of
the inevitable fallibility of all (legal) judgments.
The philosophical critique of legal justification has until re
cently been associated more with progressive or liberal than with
conservative thought. Justice Holmes, for all his hard bitten skepti
cism about political and social reform, saw efforts to achieve it as
inherent in self-government.183 The Realists were nearly all politi
177. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 40-43 (2008).
178. See id. at 157; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clin
ton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”).
179. POSNER, supra note 177, at 157.
180. Id. at 40-43.
181. Id. at 41 (citations omitted).
182. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (The Belknap
Press of Harvard University 2011); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(Harvard University Press 1977).
183. See Coppage v. Kansas, 35 S.Ct. 240, 248 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 61 S.Ct. 845 (1941); Adair v.
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cal liberals, many affiliated with the New Deal.184 Critical Legal
Studies was, without doubt, a movement of the political left.185 The
contemporary defense of the law/politics distinction has been taken
up largely by conservatives.186 Adherents to techniques of interpre
tation such as discerning the plain meaning of legal texts and dis
covering the intentions of the authors of these texts have claimed to
solve the problem of judicial ideology by anchoring the grounds for
judicial decision in sources outside the judge’s own values.187 Their
claims have mostly been convincing only to audiences who approve
of the results reached by judges who claim to follow these preferred
techniques, perhaps because textualism and originalism, whatever
their virtues, are no more capable of mechanical application to gen
erate provably correct resolutions to legal questions than are any
other, ostensibly less objective methods of decision.
There are now signs, however, that the critique of the law/
politics distinction may be becoming more bipartisan. Richard Pos
ner, a deservedly respected federal appellate judge, prolific author,
and eminent conservative thinker, has recently published a booklength argument against the possibility of the sort of judicial dis
interest valued by Illich.188 Posner’s book claims both that argu
ments from pre-existing legal sources cannot generate persuasive
answers to contested legal questions, and that most judges know
that this is so.189 Posner admits that judges (including him) nearly
always present their opinions as applications of pre-existing law to
the dispute in issue and not as impositions of their political will.190
But this mode of presentation is no more than a disingenuous con
vention made necessary by an unsophisticated public’s naı̈ve belief
United States 208 U.S. 161, 190-92 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled in part by
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 83 S.
Ct. 1028 (1963). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41
STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989).
184. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 450 (Kermit L. Hall et al.
eds. 2002).
185. See Grey, supra note 183, at 813-14. See generally UNGER, THE CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT, supra note 115.
186. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH, 109-19 (1996);
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW,
9-19, 44-49 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997).
187. See Grey, supra note 183, at 794.
188. See generally POSNER, supra note 177.
189. See id. at 39-45; see also Eric J. Segall, The Court: A Talk with Judge Richard
Posner, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Sep. 29, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/2011/sep/29/court-talk-judge-richard-posner/.
190. See POSNER, supra note 177, at 39-45; see also Segall, supra note 189.
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in the rule of law.191 Posner plainly subscribes to the more cynical
of the possible explanations suggested above for the apparent obliv
iousness of judges to the central threat to their professional legiti
macy. He, nevertheless, sees his book as a useful public service,
exposing the emperor’s nakedness for all to see, while urging a sym
pathetic understanding of, and acquiesce in, the pretense that he is
clothed.192
Posner believes that the legitimacy of adjudication will easily
survive his revelation, since the public will be content to accept po
litical decisions by judges, so long as these decisions are wise and
show appropriate deference to the prerogatives of other major
holders of political and economic power in our society.193 He may
well be right. Decisions such as Bush v. Gore,194 accepted instantly
by the public (and defended by Posner himself) despite withering
criticism from within the legal profession, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,195
are signs that he is right. But if Posner is right, particularly if his
claim that most judges see their role as he does is empirically accu
rate, the premise of Illich’s hope for the transformative potential
for law has disappeared. Unless judges have reason to maintain an
internal commitment to Illich’s virtues—due procedure, dispassion
ate openness to all arguments, and equal respect for all parties, all
that will remain is their ideology.
CONCLUSION: NOTHING IS EVER PERMANENTLY SETTLED
Ivan Illich invested hope in his ideal form of adjudication not
only because he saw it as a convivial tool in itself, but also, equally
importantly, because he believed that it meant that no issue of legal
doctrine, and therefore, of social and political structure, could ever
be permanently settled. On this second point, the inherent mallea
bility of American legal doctrine, there is ample evidence that Illich
was accurate even if this malleability is not necessarily traceable to
the gradual accretion of precedent Illich envisioned. Consider the
constitutional fate of the individual insurance purchase mandate
contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act en
acted by Congress, signed by the President in the spring of 2010.196
191. See POSNER, supra note 177, at 89.
192. See id. at 1-15.
193. See Segall, supra note 189.
194. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000).
195. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
196. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
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Prompted by a new social movement called the Tea Party,197 law
suits were filed almost immediately to challenge the constitutional
ity of the purchase mandate as beyond the enumerated power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce and to buttress such reg
ulation with measures necessary and proper to its success.198 When
this litigation was commenced, the conventional wisdom among al
most all legal observers, scholars, commentators, and practition
ers—in other words among nearly everyone with an informed
opinion except for the lawyers who filed the suits and their clients—
was that it was so meritless as to be nearly laughable.199 Commerce
power doctrine which had been settled since the New Deal made
clear that of course Congress could impose the insurance purchase
mandate as part of a comprehensive measure to regulate the very
substantial interstate market in health insurance.200
By the fall of 2011, those federal courts which had considered
the issue were divided on its constitutionality.201 A split between
two federal appellate courts on the question202 prompted the Su
preme Court to take it up during its 2011-12 term. By the time the
question was orally argued in March of 2012, it had become clear
that a significant plurality, perhaps even a narrow majority, of the
justices were sympathetic to the challenge to the individual
purchase mandate. These justices seemed poised to revisit, perhaps

197. What is the Tea Party?, TEAPARTY.ORG, http://www.teaparty.org/about.php
(last visited May 24, 2012).
198. See Associated Press, 13 Attorneys General Sue Over Health Care Overhaul,
USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2010, 1:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03
23-attorneys-general-health-suit_N.htm; N.C. Aizenman & Amy Goldstein, Judge
Strikes Down Entire New Health-Care Law, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2011, 9:32 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/31/AR2011013103804.
html; Josh Funk, AG Bruning Says Health Reform Violates Constitution, JOURNAL
STAR.COM (Mar. 22, 2010, 12:42 PM), http://journalstar.com/news/local/govt-and-polit
ics/article_cdf483b6-35c9-11df-a053-001cc4c03286.html.
199. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious
Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011).
200. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
201. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2011), reversed in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011), cert granted, 132 S.Ct. 604 (2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d
611, 635 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 671 F.3d 391, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2011); Thomas More
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d 529 (6th
Cir. 2011).
202. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1311. See generally Thomas
More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 529.
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reconsider, and maybe even revise some of that well settled New
Deal era doctrine.203
In the end, as we know, five justices were indeed prepared to
hold the purchase mandate beyond Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce.204 This view did not provide the basis for the
Court’s decision, however, because one of the five, Chief Justice
Roberts, saw the mandate as a federal tax authorized by Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution.205 His opinion, added to
those of the four justices who viewed the mandate as within the
commerce power, provided the fifth vote necessary to sustain its
constitutionality.206
We might wonder, of course, whether Illich would see the
Court’s resolution of the Affordable Care Act litigation as an ex
ample of the ideological approach to adjudication he deplored, or
as reflective of the dispassionate process of open reevaluation of
old questions that he prized. For that matter, given his low regard
for the medical services distribution system in general and the
health insurance industry in particular, we might also wonder
whether Illich would see the nearly successful challenge to the
purchase mandate as an effort to entrench, or to invert, a distinctly
unconvivial political and economic hierarchy.

203. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, 80 U.S. Law Week
3553 (April 3, 2012).
204. Nat’l Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, 567 U.S.
____, 2012 WL 2427810 (2012).
205. Id., slip op. at 31.
206. Id.

